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Deliberation and Dialogue in the Pracademic Commons1 
 
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is an effort to bring together two separate strains from my 
thought and writing over the past two decades. It is pracademic in the sense 
that it brings my own theorizing into juxtaposition with my practice in the 
classroom and community and my students’ practice in fields of the future. 
The principal proposal of the chapter is to juxtapose pracademic theory of 
deliberation and dialogue, which has generally been focused on interpersonal 
communication, with a strain of nonprofit organizational theory known as 
voluntary action, though the lens of the theory of the commons. 
Commons theory is a body of interdisciplinary insights in history, 
economics, decision, environmental and social sciences grounded in insights 
drawn from the medieval English commons, or agricultural land not held 
privately (“enclosed”) but shared by a group of collaborators, or commoners. 
(Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990, 1994, 1997;  Ostrom and Hess, 2007; Ryle and 
Richards, 1988). The commons metaphor has been influential far and wide, 
because of the rather neat way in which it synthesizes the subversions of 
group intent that can come about through the free play of unfettered rational 
self-interest. This phenomenon goes by such colorful names as “free riding” 
that point to an apparent instability or paradox in all collective action. 
(Olson, 1965) At its most pessimistic, the tragedy of the commons appears to 
suggest that all voluntary cooperation is doomed to failure, and that only 
unfettered individual self-interest can be effective in the long run.  Closer 
examinations, however, have consistently revealed this not to be the 
inevitability for consistent reasons suggesting further explanation is called 
for. One of the most thorough efforts, to date, is Benkler’s The Wealth of 
Networks (2006). In environmental studies, the “tragedy of the commons” has 
been applied to problems of wetlands, ocean fishing grounds, and global 
warming. On a more positive note, authors responding to the initiative of 
Lawrence Lessig have created completely new forms of copyright that 
emphasize sharing rather than enclosure through the formats of the “creative 
commons (CC) license”. (www.creativecommons.org) This is closely associated 
with the open software movement, and other similar developments also 
grounded in the notion of an information or knowledge commons. (Hess and 
Ostrom, 2007) Tragic commons theory would appear to suggest that such 
                                                 
1 This is an author’s preprint, a revised and edited version of which is published later as Chapter 
8, Lohmann & Van Til (2011). 
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positive efforts must fail in the long run, but the practical experience is 
otherwise often enough to reinforce the view that the tragedy can be averted. 
A major thread of my own writing has focused on the commons-like 
characteristics occurring in certain forms of nonprofit organization and 
voluntary action whenever conditions of voluntary participation, shared 
mission or purpose, and pooled resources occur. (Lohmann, 1992a; 1992b; 
Lohmann & Lohmann, 2002) Association, I have suggested, is key to 
understanding the limits of the commons tragedy, and communications 
transcending the limits of isolated individuality is essential to association: 
Rational commoners whose interest in survival is not threatened, can easily 
look beyond pursuit of their own individual self-interest and will, in most 
instances, discover a rational basis for enlightened self interest grounded in 
cooperation. In terms of the metaphor, hundreds of years of agricultural 
history teach us that under most circumstances five dairymen whose 
unfettered self-interest leads them to graze 100 cows each in a common 
pasture with a carrying capacity of 350 cows will not, ordinarily overgraze 
the pasture once they realize the physical limits they face. Real farmers the 
world over are far too pragmatic. Rather than standing idly by as the 
carrying capacity of their common fields fail, they are more likely to form an 
association to handle self-assigned allotments of a safe, fairly conservative, 
figure divisible by five (e.g., 60 cows each, for a total of 300). If they are 
“scientific” farmers, they are also likely to agree to increase their individual 
allotments one cow at a time until they observe the effects on their common 
pasture of that carrying capacity of 350. They are, in other words: 1) not 
likely to remain trapped by their own narrow self-interest, but to 
reconceptualize that self-interest; and 2) highly likely to associate voluntarily 
in order to deal with their collective problem. Agricultural history, 
anthropology and social science and common law are filled with thousands of 
examples of precisely this common sense problem-solving occurring across 
thousands of years.  
In my work, the associative commons is said to be a distinct institutional 
ideal type comparable in many respects to the state, the market, and the 
family (or, more broadly, the intimate sphere of private life). Examples of 
commons range widely from contemporary mutual aid and self-help groups 
(Borkman, 1999) to common fields agriculture (Maine, 1876), ancient 
Japanese neighborhood associations and Buddhist fundraising practices 
(Lohmann, 1995) to Latin American fiestas and contemporary nonprofit 
fundraising campaigns (Lohmann, 1992a) and include a wide variety of 
formal organizations and informal associations.  
Commons theory projects that in groups where three initial conditions 
(uncoerced participation, shared resources and shared purposes) are present, 
two additional conditions are likely to emerge to avert a commons tragedy: 1) 
social capital formation grounded in trust and a sense of mutuality, or filia 
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among participants will extend the capabilities of participants over and 
beyond what they can do alone; and 2) a shared moral order or normative 
structure to regulate participants’ behavior in the group will limit the 
potentially tragic effects of unconstrained self-interest. “We agree to limit the 
number of cows we graze…” is an example of such a moral order, which may 
be expressed in diverse forms such as legally binding contracts, “gentlemen’s 
agreements” or any of a number of other forms. The two emergent conditions 
of social capital formation and a shared moral order are critically important 
to the perspective of “the tragedy of the commons”. Where they occur, a 
tragedy is likely to averted (whether in the form of overgrazing, as in 
Hardin’s famous example, over-fishing, as in some of Ostrom’s examples, or 
social disorganization and conflict in the case of deliberation and dialogue), 
provided only that the commoners have estimated correctly. Realistically, 
calculation errors do occur even in cooperation: A cooperative agreement to 
graze 80 cows each in the example above would exceed the carrying capacity 
of their pasture in the same manner as unfettered individual self interest.  
From this, a strong connection between commons theory and deliberation 
and dialogue begins to emerge. I wish to propose two major points here: First, 
that deliberation and dialogue generally takes place within group settings 
that approximate the first three conditions of the commons ideal type; that is, 
participation is voluntary, different people attend with their own agendas, 
because common purposes have been identified or are at least suspected and 
resources (notably personal knowledge and insights) are shared. Secondly, 
the emergence of social capital, initially in the form of trust and a sense of 
mutuality, and construction of a new or reconstituted normative outlook 
typically result from successful deliberation and dialogue efforts.2  
The pracademic implication of the first point is that the insights of 
voluntary action, notably the form known in social work, sociology and other 
fields as community organization can be used to facilitate deliberation and 
dialogue. (Milofsky, 1987) This offers, among other things, an important 
explanation for why so much of deliberation and dialogue activity takes place 
in nonprofit settings. The pracademic implication of the second point is that 
recent work on social capital formation and the social construction of moral 
outlooks can be harnessed to further the aims and objectives of deliberation 
and dialogue. (See my last chapter in this book for further development of 
this point.) 
                                                 
2 Indeed, it is my personal belief that the discovery of the potential of this creativity 
and the possibilities of reconciliation this represents is among the most important 
discoveries of the modern social sciences.  
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Background 
This theoretical work has gradually converged with practical insights 
from my teaching. Like several of the other authors in this volume, I teach in 
a public university in central Appalachia where many of the students come 
from rural and small town settings.3 In the wake of the bombing of the Meir 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, on top of threats to the welfare 
state paradigm, and the longer-term but nonetheless dramatic rise of 
incivility in American life, it became clear to me that the time had come to 
reposition my graduate social policy seminar away from presentation of the 
“received truths” of the liberal social policy tradition. (These developments 
were summarized in Lohmann, 1998)  I was concerned that the conventional 
curricular approach was merely reinforcing the silence of Appalachian 
students who are, under the best of circumstances, not inclined to speak out 
publicly on social policy issues and questions. The problem is especially acute 
for those students who bring into the classroom their desire for a career in 
social work combined with assorted  “non-enlightened” viewpoints that differ 
significantly from the received truths of the social work profession. They may 
be personally in favor of school prayer, for example, or opposed to a woman’s 
right to choose on moral grounds or hold other, similar opinions that diverge 
from national social work norms. Student silence, in this case, is a tactical 
posture that has the effect of further undermining already weak norms of 
public participation. 
After more than 30 years of teaching in Appalachia (at the Universities of 
Tennessee and West Virginia) one could hardly be unaware of the lack of 
political efficacy and sense of powerlessness or “quiescence” that students 
from the region bring into the classroom from their home communities. (see 
Gaventa, 1980 for an acute analysis of the reasons for this) The larger (and 
largely unseen) forces that continue to govern the politics of Appalachia are 
taken so much for granted that conventional arguments for policy advocacy 
and civic engagement either fall largely on deaf ears or take on the character 
of revolutionary acts and conventional “empowerment” approaches often fail 
to connect.  Students learn from the time they are small children that the 
ubiquitous other (“they”) control everything and that there is little more to 
say; why bother trying what you know must fail? These are hardly ideal 
conditions for the growth of active, engaged forms of citizenship and often 
make for an overwhelming sense of futility in the policy classroom. 
In recent years, I have sought in different ways to move toward a more 
dialogical and deliberative approach to teaching social policy in which 
students focus on exploring their own views about current issues and 
                                                 
3  In the lexicon of the Appalachian Regional Commission, West Virginia is (or is the 
predominant part of) Central Appalachia. 
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explaining and justifying them to others who may disagree.4 Sad to say, long-
sought reconciliation of differences between supporters and opponents of 
issues such as abortion, welfare-as-anyone-knows-it, or real social security 
are still elusive. Even so, students regularly report leaving the course with a 
new and greater sense of their own efficacy as citizen-professionals and a 
stronger sense that their opinions matter. Based on the experience of this 
course, I have recently joined with others who have their own, similar 
insights into the region (including the other authors in this book) in efforts to 
promote a stronger sense of active citizenship in the state and region. 
Commons Theory 
 
In The Commons: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Nonprofit 
Organization, Voluntary Action, and Philanthropy (Lohmann, 1992) I laid out 
a theoretical interpretation of the essential characteristics of nonprofit 
organization, voluntary action and philanthropy as commons.   In that work, 
the ideal type of a commons is contrasted with incentive-driven firms and 
rule-directed public bureaus, and reaches beyond narrowly culture-bound 
conceptions of “nonprofit organizations”.  The commons model of association 
also identifies an important role for strategic conversation – deliberation and 
dialogue – in the formulation and continuation of all forms of nonprofit 
practice. 
Several of my colleagues have long been inquiring of me what the 
‘practical’ implications of this bit of high blown theorizing might be. Most 
recently, this question has arisen within the context of the mission of the 
Nova Institute, at West Virginia University.5 What connection is there, I 
have been asked numerous times, between nonprofit organizations and 
deliberation and dialogue? While there are several possible implications, the 
most intriguing involves voluntary action commons as the matrix out of 
which the formation of new institutions of democratic practice might arise. 
Quite literally, in a familiar formula we all recognize, engaged talk 
                                                 
4 In 2005, for example, on the tenth anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
students in the seven sections of the policy course were asked by their instructors to 
conduct public deliberation sessions throughout the state in the first-ever statewide 
celebration of Deliberation Day. We even sought (unsuccessfully) to enlist the 
Governor to proclaim the day West Virginia Deliberation Day. We did have nearly 
150 deliberation events in all parts of the state that day and received television 
coverage on the local news. 
5 The Nova Institute itself is an outgrowth of the classroom initiative discussed above, 
together with the appointment as Carlson Distinguished Professor of Social Work of 
my co-editor and co-founder Jon Van Til. (See the web site at http://nova.as.wvu.edu) 
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stimulates action, some portion of which will be of enduring value and 
become institutionalized over time. 
To further clarify that rather bold assertion, the perspective of the 
commons is the central anchor point of this chapter, which seeks to: 1) step 
apart from the assumptions and viewpoints of incentive- and rule-based 
interpretations of practice and policy in the public arena and nonprofit worlds 
AND the customary discursive (talky) assumptions of deliberation and 
dialogue and 2) redirect a line of discussion and research on practice and 
policy questions affecting the nonprofit sector within the broad perspective 
variously identified as dialogical, interactive, interpretive or pragmatic. For 
ease of understanding, I shall refer to variations in this broad view in what 
follows as a pragmatic or dialogical perspective. (For a fuller philosophical 
basis of this point of view see Bernstein, 1971, 1976, 1981;  Habermas, 1984; 
and Heath, 2001) 
Pragmatic Perspectives 
Pragmatic (also sometimes identified as problem-solving) perspectives are 
part of a long-standing tradition of actual practice in nonprofit organization, 
voluntary action and philanthropy studies.6   The essentials of pragmatism, 
from a policy and practice (pracademic) standpoint, include emphasis upon 
learning processes; the evaluation of action in terms of the consequences of 
acts; emphasis on certain parallels between scientific and democratic decision 
processes; explicit rejection of dualism, particularly as it supports different 
approaches to resolving factual and value problems (reflected linguistically in 
the dualistic either/or merged by the term pracademic); the non-serial 
selection of means and ends in light of one another; a consequentialism, or 
emphasis on evaluation by results or outcomes; and a strong interactional (as 
opposed to structural) approach to organizations.    
At least from the time of John Dewey, pragmatic problem-solving models 
have been important approaches to practice issues in groups and voluntary 
action.  This same perspective figures importantly in a number of 
organizational, management, planning and policy models.    The emphasis is 
on democratic action, science and face-to-face interaction in the pragmatists 
Dewey, Mead, James and Pierce as it has been more recently in the 
                                                 
6 This is quite distinct from most contemporary conceptual perspectives which, apart 
from Van Til, Milofsky, Smith, a few others and I working in the voluntary action 
tradition, seek largely to formulate the problem of nonprofit organization in 
bureaucratic terms as a problem of transmitting incentives rather than developing 
understanding, and formulating rules rather than formulating community. From this 
perspective, it may appear to border on complete incoherence to suggest a connection 
between deliberation and dialogue and nonprofit organization.  
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interactional, constructivist, negotiated order and other perspectives arising 
from them.   
The theory of the commons enables a shift of attention away from large, 
wealthy, powerful (and bureaucratic) institutions and quasi-commercial 
nonprofit firms engaged solely in-service delivery.  Instead, the theory 
emphasizes participatory, collective, mutual and expressive endeavors, which 
are often also smaller in scale and scope, in control of fewer and more limited 
resources and generally capable of wielding less social influence.   That is, 
the theory of the commons seeks to locate the “heart and soul” of the third 
sector in self-defining commons whose “raw materials” are conversational: 
deliberative and dialogical.  And, how do participation, collective and 
expressive action take place? 
The incorporation statutes, tax-policies and service-contracting strategies 
of the welfare state provide the skeletal structure of the contemporary 
commons.  But the clearest expressions of the pursuit of common goods are to 
be found in the conversations of community churches, self-help and mutual 
aid groups, volunteer fire departments, hobby clubs, scientific societies and 
other similar groups, clubs, associations and societies.  These are the groups 
which determine for themselves their own rules of participation and 
engagement and who carry out their own agendas, largely unaided by 
outsiders, using their own resources and building a satisfactory sense of 
mutuality (which the ancient Greeks called philia) in the process.  
It is a principal thesis of this chapter that the ultimate advance of public 
deliberation and sustained dialogue is not to be found in the promotion of 
these forms of public talk as abstract principles nor ends in themselves, nor 
in the advocacy of specific methodologies of talking. The real promise of these 
approaches will come only through the building of new forms of discursive 
democratic institutions – groups, associations, organizations and movements 
– in which talk designed to advance principles of self-efficacy, self-control and 
self-governance plays a central role. This was the approach taken by early 
pioneers of deliberative democracy like Jane Addams and Mary Parker 
Follett and the same approach is workable today. 
Uncoerced, cooperative, mutual, shared fair play in pursuit of self-
identified goals or ends, as known in the theory as common goods, is 
definitive in the third sector.  It is this model of common action which 
nonprofit law recognizes, and tax policy encourages. It is this model of joint 
action which civics texts and politicians (in their better moments) extol.  It is 
such action, which is often referred to as “grass-roots” and “community-
based”.  Regrettably, this message is all too often blunted and maligned by 
wealthy and powerful interests seeking to use the cover of the commons to 
serve their own interests. The paradigmatic role of defining the third, 
community or social sector has been to an important degree co-opted by the 
large foundations, national association oligarchies and quasi-commercial 
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nonprofit firms that so effectively position themselves to speak in the name of 
the third sector today even while they seek to change its fundamental 
character.   
So What? 
In formulating the theory of the commons, I chose to defer consideration of 
questions of practice and policy until a basic outline of the nature of the 
commons itself had been set out.  I did so in part because it was clear to me 
that the theory did not point easily in the accustomed direction of nonprofit 
management improvements – attention to outcomes and accountability to 
outsiders, more resources, better volunteers, more effective boards and the 
like – but in other directions entirely.  This paper is one step in an effort to 
re-engage the practical issues set aside earlier and focus on part of that 
direction most related to deliberation and dialogue.   
Several seemingly unrelated intellectual and practical trends have been 
converging in recent decades that set the backdrop for this current effort.7   
Of particular note have been the resurgence of interest in pragmatism among 
American philosophers and, in particular, the selective embrace of 
pragmatism and interactional social science by Jürgen Habermas, the heir 
apparent of European critical theory.  (Geuss, 1981)  Unfortunately, the 
pracademic importance of this resurgence has been dampened somewhat by 
the general din over ‘postmodernism’ and the reaction against ‘relativism’. 
Whether or not all of physical or economic science, for example, reduces to 
dialogue, there is no reduction involved in applying dialogical perspectives to 
voluntary action. If anything, it is the application of overly rationalistic 
economic and systems models where the reductionism has come in. 
Through the work of philosophers like Richard Bernstein and Joseph 
Heath, the continuing American dialogues over the meaning of Habermas’ 
dialogical theories have the potential of reopening broader interest in the 
potentials of democratic organization and participation which more than half 
a century ago energized discussions of citizen and client participation, 
volunteerism, collaboration, social democracy, community and a range of 
related philosophical works by John Dewey, Charles H. Cooley, Mary Parker 
Follett and others. (Bernstein, 1971; Bernstein, 1976; Bernstein, 1981; 
Habermas, 1984; Heath, 2001) 
Guided by such traditional and contemporary theoretical concerns, the 
objectives of a suitable project to explore the policy and practice implications 
of the theory of the commons for deliberation and dialogue can be 
summarized as follows:  
                                                 
7 The adoption by the Obama campaign of a more deliberative approach to national 
politics is simply one such approach. 
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- To recapture the radical democratic practice and policy implications 
of Charles S. Pierce’s pragmatic model of scientific community 
and John Dewey’s model of democratic community; for perhaps 
the first time in human history modern societies are 
increasingly positioning themselves against any systematically 
silenced portions of the population and toward giving voice to all 
citizens. However, the institutional challenges of enabling 
meaningful and fruitful conversations for all are daunting. 
-  Operationalize the convergence of instrumental, objectivist and 
relativist perspectives which Richard Bernstein and others see 
in the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas, with its central focus 
on the ideal speech act;  (Bernstein, 1981) 
- Establish more vigorous, pragmatic critical theory as the basis for 
fundamental social criticism and social reconstruction; inherent 
in such a model are the ‘moments’ of public deliberation as a 
mode of social criticism and the social capital (relationship and 
trust) building processes of sustained dialogue. 
- Ultimately, to discover and embrace more vigorous models of civil 
society consisting of an integrated community of emancipated 
and enlightened citizens realizing their collective life through 
the medium of unconstrained interaction and dialogue. It is 
akey  thesis of the commons model that nonprofit organizations 
offer the principia media currently available for genuine 
movement in that direction.   
Focusing on this convergence of voluntary action and deliberation and 
dialogue also points toward the need for a “third way” in public life. (Giddens, 
2000; Giddens, 2001; Loyal, 2003) Pragmatic approaches to policy concerned 
with addressing this broad middle ground will likely offer major alternatives 
to both the discredited doctrines of state-socialism and the highly-fashionable 
but equally dubious doctrines of anti-statist individualism, social Darwinism 
and laissez-faire market economics which erupted back into political fashion 
in the 1980’s after nearly a century of well-deserved neglect, which still poses 
the potential to permanently abridge the future of democracy. (Phillips, 2002) 
Policy and Practice Defined 
 
An approach to policy as determining the ends of collective action in civil 
society and practice as concern for the ways and means of attaining those 
ends are fundamental to examination of the above objectives.   Thus, before 
we can proceed further with any of these considerations, some clarification of 
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the key terms social policy and social practice from a pragmatic standpoint 
would be in order. 
Social Policy 
 
The economist Kenneth Boulding nearly three decades ago defined 
social policy in the following way:   
“If there is one common thread that unites all aspects of social policy 
and distinguishes them from merely economic policy, it is the thread of 
what has elsewhere been called the ‘integrative system’.  This includes 
those aspects of social life that are characterized not so much by 
exchange in which a quid is got from a quo as by unilateral transfers 
that are justified by some kind of appeal to a status or legitimacy, 
identity or community.  The institutions with which social policy is 
especially concerned, such as the school, family, church, or at the other 
end, the public assistance office, court, prison, or criminal gang, all 
reflect degrees of integration and community.  By and large, it is the 
objective of social policy to build the identity of a person around some 
community with which it is associated.”  (Boulding, 1967.) 
We can surmise that a concern with “building the identity of a person 
around some community with which it is associated” offers at least an initial 
approximation of the process, which occurs more or less spontaneously in all 
genuinely common action.  This is also what several generations of social 
policy architects have sought to capture and harness for some larger social 
good with the citizen participation components of the Community Action 
Program, ACTION, Model Cities, the Older Americans Act and numerous 
other public programs.   
If the past half century in social policy establishes anything it is that 
identity formation, community building and social problem solving are not 
abstract processes or technologies that respond well to plans, incentives or 
rules. As Chris Plein’s chapter in this book and the massive social planning 
critique that grew up in the 1970s and 1980s make clear, “community 
development” is, in its essential respects a process of conversations.  
In the prevailing rationalist and positivist models of policy and practice 
widely in vogue today, any concern of social policy for integration and the 
furthering of community is usually translated into largely technical and 
instrumental terms that are, in many respects, parodies of their pragmatic 
origins:  How, we often hear, can anyone possibly reach any intelligent 
conclusions about the consequences of one’s actions without a suitable 
schema of outcome measures and systematic data collection?  Massive 
breakdowns of human communication and understanding like the riots in Los 
Angeles surprise us even as their underlying causes elude us.  Rather than a 
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common, mutual search for individual identity and shared community, social 
policy is frequently reduced to an endless quest for the most ‘efficient and 
effective’ means to achieve pre-determined or fixed ends projected to be 
beyond the reach of common conversation and interaction.    
Despite numerous critiques, the stream of positive and rational 
instrumentalism runs very deep and wide in contemporary social policy 
thinking.  Even the venerable British social policy analyst Richard Titmuss, 
fell victim to its influence in his widely quoted definition of policy: “The word 
policy can be taken to refer to the principles that govern action directed 
toward given ends.” (Emphasis added) (Titmuss, 1968, 3)   If the ends are 
truly given, as Titmuss’ definition (and all economic thinking on policy) 
suggests, what else can there be to talk about? 
In the policy arena, the beginning of dialogue is to be found in the 
recognition that truly democratic society can have no ends that are truly 
given.8 They must constantly be negotiated and renegotiated. Discussed and 
deliberated. Democratic legitimacy grounded in the people necessarily 
involves the right of the people to decide upon the ends of public policy and 
such decisions require many layers of an unending conversation. In the world 
of interest group-driven politics, spending and voting may be seen as media of 
such conversation. In a more legitimate democratic politics, they are not. 
Such a view of social policy as principally concerned with spelling out the 
means for attaining pre-determined or given ends is completely inconsistent 
with the reality of much contemporary social legislation.  What Robert 
Binstock called the “new welfare” legislation of the late 1960s is typically 
characterized by vague, general objectives and impossibly broad and global 
intentions: eliminating poverty; cleaning up the environment; ending family 
violence or rebuilding the cities.  (Binstock and Ely, 1971)  Interestingly, in 
many instances over the past three decades, such sweeping policy objectives 
are declared by the state and then subcontracted to nonprofit organizations 
for implementation with no further clarification of meaning or intent.   This 
may be, as is often suggested, a massive “buck-passing” exercise on the part 
of timid, self-serving politicians.  Even so, it is also recognition (albeit, partly 
faulty recognition) of the norm-building and consensus generating 
capabilities of common action.  Nonprofit community groups can do what 
government bureaus typically cannot. Carry on the public talks that give real 
meaning to the lofty, but often vacuous clichés of social policy.  
Unfortunately, such conversations are carried out too often in the “we-
group” contexts of true believers on the one hand, and critics and opponents 
on the other. True believers on one side convinced of the effectiveness of Head 
                                                 
8 The most convincing one-two punch on this point that I am aware of is still 
Benjamin Barber’s critique of political philosophy usurping democracy in Barber 
(1988) and his endorsement of public deliberation in Strong Democracy (1984). 
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Start, and true believers on the other equally certain of the effectiveness of 
workfare in welfare reform (each of whom is skeptical of the other’s issue) 
seldom find ways or places for genuine discussion and dialogue. 
This is too bad because it completely ignores a reality known to the 
ancient Greeks as philia and often translated as civic friendship: Real 
commons are capable of creating genuine, plausible, authentic ends and 
engaging in coordinated action in pursuit of such common goods.  But 
nonprofit contractors are generally not really commons and lack the capacity 
for norm-building and consensus precisely because of their incentive- and 
rule-based organization. Ultimately, it also ignores what we might call the 
conciliatory power of genuine dialogue. Reconciliation is not sufficiently 
recognized as a motive in democratic public policymaking (Hardimon, 1994) 
We are currently so jaded and cynical in our politics as to all but dismiss 
entirely the possibility of genuine reconciliation of real differences. The model 
of the commons keeps us alert to that ever-present possibility. 
In any case, the ability of all types of nonprofit organizations, voluntary 
associations and philanthropic endeavors to identify mutually acceptable 
ends in a manner which reinforces and even increases levels of integration 
and solidarity among members is one of the most interesting and fascinating 
aspects of the commons.    At the same time, one of the strongest points of 
pragmatic theory has always been the ability to evaluate ends in terms of 
means and means in light of ends which it offers. 
 
The Grandstand View 
 
Another related major issue in contemporary social policy is the tendency 
to adopt the grandstand view of rational policy and practice models.   Both 
this and the tendency to reduce democracy to philosophical principles noted 
by Barber are evident, for example, in the definition of social policy offered by 
David Gil.  “Social policies are principles or courses of action designed to 
influence the overall quality of life in a society, the circumstances of living of 
individuals and groups in that society, and the nature of intra-societal 
relationships among individuals, groups and society as a whole.”  (Gil, 1990.)   
Where are these privileged souls who stand apart from the society they 
presume to judge and observe it as a totality? The notion that anyone casting 
themselves in the role of a social policy analyst can sit apart from and 
observe from some objective vantage point the “overall quality of life of a 
society” as well as the full range of circumstances of living and the 
relationships among members of that society is a clear expression of such a 
grandstand view.  It also represents a very profound threat to meaningful 
democracy and a tacit endorsement of oligarchic control by professional 
guardians.  
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Social Practice 
Any concern for social practice is at least partly a concern for deliberate 
acts in which purpose, intent and direction are major concerns.   The social 
practices associated with forming, operating and working within nonprofit 
organizational programs of voluntary action and philanthropy were once 
generally interpreted from a pragmatic viewpoint which simultaneously 
emphasized the micro-social view of intelligent group action and the macro-
social view of constructing democratic community life.   More recently, 
however, many social practice approaches on the third sector have been 
dominated by social technology perspectives that place primary or exclusive 
emphasis on the mastery of method and technique for attaining fixed ends 
through the application of positive knowledge.9   
It is of interest, therefore, that one of Habermas’ most fundamental 
criticisms of modern society involves the displacement of praxis in the sense, 
for example of social policy practice intended to further the good and just life, 
by techne, or the expert mastery of objectified tasks (what in social work are 
termed methods).  (Habermas, 1978; Bernstein, 1981)  Techne is entirely 
consistent with a practice of deliberation and dialogue that places primary 
emphasis on the group-process methods for attaining established ends such 
as a predetermined opinion-outcome, and which seeks to evaluate practice 
primarily in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of attaining such ends.   
It is also entirely consistent with a grandstand view of society, which places 
the analysis and the analyst or advocate ‘objectively’ outside the flow of 
action.   
Reliance on techne (that is, prescribed methods) is not consistent with a 
meaningful model of deliberative democracy or living a good and just life. The 
economic model of instrumental rationality that justifies efficient and 
effective means is an instrumental rationality for identifying the best 
methods for attaining given ends. (Elstub, 2008, 28-30) Deliberation and 
dialogue, at their most meaningful, involve conversations over the 
identification and selection of those ends, goals or purposes; conversation that 
must, necessarily precede the selection of the most effective and efficient 
                                                 
9 Among the most absurd examples of this tendency at present are efforts to extend 
evidence-based practice perspectives to social policy “practice”. This is tantamount to 
a highly anti-democratic suggestion that those already credentialed as citizens by the 
state require additional credentialing by private social researchers investigating what 
works and monitors to guage their actual behavior before expressions of their 
citizenship can be considered legitimate. Evidence-based practice of assorted 
therapeutic practices make sense; evidence-based practice applied to social policy is 
simply an absurdity. 
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means for achieving them, and which instrumental rationality simply does 
not address. There are no democratically legitimate ways to overrule the will 
of a group that emerges from its own group process about how they wish to 
conduct their own group deliberations. For these purposes, the groups 
literature can offer no prescriptive ‘best practices’ consistent with meaningful 
participatory democracy. They can only offer the guidance of what appears to 
have worked for others in the past with no guarantees or warrants of positive 
result. 
Entirely consistent with models of social policy which emphasize technical 
means over group ends and the grandstand viewpoint of the policy analyst 
and developer is the emerging positivistic model of social practice as “policy 
implementation.”  Another expression of this view is the often-heard notion of 
social practice (in this case, deliberation and dialogue) as “applied social 
science.”  In both cases, social practice is conceived as a follow-on activity, 
which proceeds from or develops out of research and/or policy-making in 
which the objective insights of research as commodity are applied to “the real 
world”. The pragmatic model of science, by contrast, has always emphasized 
the nature of the discovery process as fundamental to both science and 
practice. 
In many contemporary articulations of this view, the basic operations of 
nonprofit organizations and voluntary associations and many practice 
communities found in the third sector in the human services as well as the 
arts, health care and other fields are subjected to a kind of correspondence 
theory: The everyday life worlds of those commons and the theoretical, 
conception and empirical knowledge of those commons possessed by social 
scientists are fashioned as the parallel universes of "reality" and theory and 
in which research-based theory can be packaged so as to be directly, 
unproblematically and unequivocally “applied” to future acts in what is 
usually termed “the real world.”  
One of the most telling criticisms that can be leveled at contemporary 
third sector perspectives is the relative absence (or perhaps the restricted 
influence) of genuinely political and conversational perspectives in this 
rational-technical worldview. The profoundly political (or, civic) nature of 
nonprofit, voluntary and philanthropic decision and action is either ignored 
entirely, or treated as one, among many competing paradigms.  (For an 
alternative view that restores emphasis on conversation and relationships in 
politics, see Saunders, 2005) 
Policy, Practice and Intelligence 
In contrast to other perspectives, a focus on deliberation and dialogue in 
the commons downplays the importance of "rational" choice, particularly as 
defined by "the rational method", and substitute instead the importance of 
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rational as well as the "irrational" considerations including ethics, emotions, 
intuition and aesthetics.  
“The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind 
is to project new and more complex ends -- to free experience from 
routine and caprice.  Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes 
already given in the mechanism of the body or in the extant state of 
society but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is 
the pragmatic lesson.”  (Dewey, 1916, p. 63f)   
In contemporary social policy discussions, various efforts have come close 
to capturing the essential characteristics of the pragmatic theory of 
intelligence within the technical language of policy analysis. John 
Friedmann’s model of planning, distinguishing adaptive (instrumental) from 
innovative planning using creative intelligence in the way discussed by 
Dewey above. Charles Lindblom’s models of “disjointed incrementalism” and 
“strategic analysis” capture the essential pragmatic qualities of precedent, 
process and context implicit in Dewey’s viewpoint. Herbert Simon’s (1957) 
emphasis on rational decision-making under conditions of partial and 
insufficient information and the perspectival limits implicit in the concept of 
“satisficing” are also largely consistent with the viewpoint of Dewey and his 
colleague George Herbert Mead of intelligence grounded concretely in social 
life. 
Richard Bernstein, in particular, has been forthright in proclaiming the 
emergence of “a new sensibility and universe of discourse. . . which sought to 
interpret dialectically the empirical, interpretive and critical dimensions of a 
theoretical orientation that is directed toward practical activity.”  (Bernstein, 
1981, p. x; Bernstein, 1976)   Bernstein’s (1981) argument, as well as his title, 
characterizes this emergent paradigm as a movement Beyond Objectivism 
and Relativism.   A principal inspiration for The Commons (Lohmann, 1992) 
was Bernstein’s view of a growing convergence of European “critical theory” 
with American pragmatism and British-American analytical philosophy as 
exemplified in the work of Jürgen Habermas.   There is much yet to be done 
in exploring the implications of some of those themes for the practice of 
deliberation and dialogue in the commons.   
Conclusion   
 
The metaphor of the commons poses two quite different lessons for 
practice: For neo-classical economists, practicing lawyers and accountants, as 
well as certain philosophers, behavioral psychologists and others of a 
rationalist mind, the message should be one of relief and hope: You may 
continue to hold to the tragic position that the quest for common meaning is a 
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futile one, or you can look around you and see that it doesn’t have to be that 
way.  
Collective action – in this case, the collective talk of deliberation and 
dialogue – does not have to be seen in fundamentally tragic terms. This is as 
true of the husband and wife locked in mortal combat of a marital dispute, as 
it is of two nations. Neighbors do find ways to build shared fences. There is 
more to life than the unfettered display of naked self-interest. Not only can 
self-interested individuals find ways to talk together and form a common 
front.  
The message of commons theory to true believers in deliberation and 
dialogue may be the flip side of the same message: The process of finding 
common ground is not a given. Deliberation and dialogue do not 
automatically lead to reconciliation in all circumstances, and even when they 
will be getting there can be sweaty, exhausting, hard work. 
The underlying policy and practice imperative of the theory of the 
commons should be seen as nothing less than a renaissance of the Deweyian 
objective of recreating the endangered democratic public sphere by 
revitalizing community life.  What clearer rationale could there be for 
deliberation and dialogue? Isn’t this what “citizen participation” and 
“community development” and “coproduction” are (or should be) all about?  
The challenge of practice in the commons continues to be not simply one of 
how can I make myself understood and how can I best achieve my own ends, 
but also one of how can I fully understand what it is that you want as well? 
In the coalition of interests often termed “interest group politics” of course, 
this is a relatively simple process of finding likeminded people and coalescing 
with them. The challenges of practice at the present, however, arise more 
from the voiceless who lack (or have lost) the capacity to speak their minds, 
and even more from the challenges of cacophony: How, in a world of many 
voices, with many views can we not only speak, but also listen and genuinely 
understand what others may be saying? And, reaching that understanding, 
how can we then learn to act together in democratic community? Deliberation 
and dialogue programs organized by nonprofit organizations on the principles 
of the commons offer an important place to start. 
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